There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement to incentive contracting. We argue that incentive contracts and selection can be both complements and substitutes conditional on the contracting difficulty faced by the firm. We examine these...

There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement to incentive contracting. We argue that incentive contracts and selection can be both complements and substitutes conditional on the contracting difficulty faced by the firm. We examine these...

We examine whether a firm's strategic priorities influence their selection of a new CEO and what conditions enable such an appointment to add value to the firm. More specifically, this study investigates the value-adding effect when prospector firms (i.e., those pursuing a prospector-type...

Management scholars are beginning to provide empirical evidence that organization identity (OI) can be a powerful means of reducing agency costs. We examine whether an individual's identity with the firm influences the agency costs associated with incentive contracts, namely earnings...

The objective of this chapter is to synthesise empirical research studying the design and use of performance measurement and compensation systems (PMCS) in complex settings, specifically when decision makers face uncertainty. We analyse recent papers in the accounting literature that investigate...

Accounting performance measures are often argued to lead to short-sighted behavior by managers facing intertemporal decisions. We assess the association between different types of performance measures and the time horizon of business unit managers who have profit responsibility. Our results,...