In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that even if all agents share the same preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and...

In this paper, we consider the problem of ranking linear budget sets with different available goods. We introduce axioms that are based on preference-based and preference-independent views of evaluating freedom, as well as two basic axioms. By using these axioms, we characterize two ranking rules

In this paper, we study the problem of fair allocation in production economies where agents have different preferences and unequal production skills. We characterize the equal income Walrasian solution and the proportional solution using axioms of equity and a certain form of implementability...

We consider the problem of ranking linear budget sets. After discussing a difference between two approaches suggested by Xu (Soc Choice Welf 22:281–289, 2004) and Kolm (Soc Choice Welf 2009), we introduce three axioms which are motivated by Kolm's approach. Using the three axioms, we...

In this paper, we axiomatically characterize a maximin social ordering using principles of impartiality, efficiency, equity, and social rationality. By doing so, we claim that axiomatic characterization is a useful method to consider theories of pluralist egalitarianism

In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents' discount factors may be different. We first show that there exists a conflict between efficiency, equity, and time consistency, even if all agents share the same discount factor. We argue that this impossibility result...

In a simple model where agents' monetary payoffs are uncertain, this paper studies the aggregation of subjective expected utility functions which are interpersonally noncomparable. A maximin social welfare criterion is derived from axioms of efficiency, equity, and social rationality, combained...

In a simple model where agents have ordinal and interpersonally noncomparable subjective expected utility preferences over uncertain future incomes, we analyze the implications of equity, efficiency, separability, and social rationality. Our efficiency conditions are fairly weak, because there...