Motivated by VAR evidence, we develop a monetary DSGE model where an agency problem between bank financiers, stemming from limited liability and unobservable risk taking, distorts banks' incentives leading them to choose excessively risky investments. A monetary policy expansion magnifies these...

Empirical research suggests that lower interest rates induce banks to take higher risks. We assess analytically what this risk-taking channel implies for optimal monetary policy in a tractable New Keynesian model. We show that this channel creates a motive for the planner to stabilize the real...

How important is the risk-taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem which distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these...

Empirical research suggests that lower interest rates induce banks to take higher risks. We assess analytically what this risk-taking channel implies for optimal monetary policy in a tractable New Keynesian model. We show that this channel creates a motive for the planner to stabilize the real...

Empirical research suggests that lower interest rates induce banks to take higher risks. We assess analytically what this risk-taking channel implies for optimal monetary policy in a tractable New Keynesian model. We show that this channel creates a motive for the planner to stabilize the real...

We assess to what extent indicators of financial conditions can be considered relevant determinants and predictors of macroeconomic aggregates. The main finding is that controlling for default risk and risk aversion measures improves the forecasts of output, employment and loans, but that this...