Similar Search Results

Middle-class flight from post-Katrina New Orleans : a theoretical analysis of inequality and schooling

Barbieri, Stefano; Edwards, John H. Y. - In: Regional science & urban economics 64 (2017), pp. 12-29

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792590

Indivisibility and preference for collective provision

Edwards, John H. Y. - In: Regional science & urban economics 22 (1992) 4, pp. 559-577

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001135769

Congestion function specification and the "publicness" of local public goods

Edwards, John H. Y. - In: Journal of urban economics 27 (1990) 1, pp. 80-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001165650

The impact of school quality on earnings and educational returns : evidence from a low-income country

Bedi, Arjun Singh; Edwards, John H. Y. - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001612942

The impact of school quality on earnings and educational returns : evidence from a low-income country

Bedi, Arjun Singh; Edwards, John H. Y. - In: Journal of development economics 68 (2002) 1, pp. 157-185

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674532

Efficient allocations in club economies

Berliant, Marcus C.; Edwards, John H. Y. - In: Journal of public economic theory 6 (2004) 1, pp. 43-63

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002194787

Losers distribution, with applications to financial inclusion : lightning can strike twice, but it may not strike at all

Edwards, John H. Y. - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012201405

Communication and early contributions

Barbieri, Stefano - In: Journal of public economic theory 14 (2012) 3, pp. 391-421

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009670478

Voluntary public good provision with private information using order statistics

Barbieri, Stefano - In: Economics letters 150 (2017), pp. 63-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762878

Private-Information Group Contests

Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A. - 2015

We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, each group's performance equals the best effort ("best shot") of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. At the symmetric equilibrium of symmetric contests, increasing the number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142038