We demonstrate that in simple 2 X 2 games (cumulative) prospect theory preferences can be evolutionarily stable, i.e. a population of players with prospect theory preferences can not be invaded by more rational players. This holds also if probability weighting is applied to the probabilities of...

Analyzing a large sample of U.S. firms, we show that the asymmetry of stock return volatility is positively related to investor attention and differences of opinion. Using the number of analysts following a given firm to capture attention and the dispersion in analyst forecasts as a common proxy...

This paper investigates corporate hedging under regret aversion. Regret-averse firms try to avoid deviations of their hedging policy from the ex post best policy, an intuitive consideration if one has to justify one's decisions afterward. The study presents a model of a firm that faces uncertain...

Contents Part I Foundations 1 Introduction 3 1.1 An Introduction to This Book 3 1.2 An Introduction to Financial Economics ...