If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of...

The authors analyze the possibility of tradeoffs between efficiency and equity as well as the possibility of distributional conflicts in the context of renegotiation of infrastructure contracts in developing countries. To do so, they present a model in which contracts are awarded by auctioning...

We investigate the interactions between optimal regulation and external credit constraints. When part of a regulated firm is owned by foreign investors, a credit-constrained country who wants to send profits abroad has to generate enough surplus in the trade account in order to compensate...

We revisit the private value informed principal model as introduced in Maskin and Tirole (1990). We improve on their model in two dimensions. First, we show that their results about efficiency and uniqueness of the equilibrium still hold in a context in which the principal is constrained to...

In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. First, if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal's offer, the dominant-strategy implementation...

If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator. Indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of...