Asheim et al. (2006, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.51, pp.93-109) show that participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) can be doubled in a two-region world by the Regional Penance strategy, designating countries that are permitted to punish...

This research aims to relax the condition in which international environmental agreements consists of asymmetric countries are sustained for a long-term, considering a repeated game model and the effect of ancillary benefits. We suppose all countries have the feature of two-sided asymmetry: the...

This paper examines the climate change treaties with cooperative R&D that brings about substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emission. By developing a joiner's gain function, we present a new approach under which countries that have invested in R&D can recover their R&D costs by breakthrough...

This paper presents a new framework of international environmental agreements (IEAs) with technological development that incorporates an initial payment and refunding scheme (IPRS) in collaboration with third-party organizations (TPOs). In our IPRS, technological development is carried out by...