We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring ambiguous priors. First, we find … mixing by respectively S or R as embodying two different modes of ambiguous communication. Second, we find that for … implement his optimal decision rule and influential communication may be altogether impossible. We remark that these results …

This paper studies the effect of endogenous group formation on the outcome in two types of coordination games with … more groups within which they want to play the coordination game. In the theoretical part we show that a simple myopic best … reply dynamics under endogenous group formation leads to the payoff dominant outcome in both types of coordination games …

We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. The underlying … coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered …

A laboratory experiment studies coordination and cooperation in games played in different networks - local, random and … small-world. Coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium was faster in small-world networks than in local and random …

coordination problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient labeling and learning dynamics …. Contrary to previous experiments, we find that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria is not an easy task for … significantly helps coordination, but only when subjects are pre-instructed to think of the wheel network as a reasonable way to …

We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about … deciding whether or not to contribute. Without communication, the unique equilibrium is fully efficient. We study whether the … introduction of communication about returns can destroy efficiency. Communication can be precise (about the exact return), or vague …

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …