Agencies possess enormous regulatory discretion. This discretion allows executive branch agencies in particular to insulate their decisions from presidential review by raising the costs of such review. They can do so, for example, through variations in policymaking form, cost-benefit analysis...

Regulatory arbitrage — defined as the manipulation of regulatory treatment for the purpose of reducing regulatory costs or increasing statutory earnings — is often seen in heavily-regulated industries. An increase in the regulatory nature of copyright, coupled with rapid technological...

In our book, Law, Economics, and Morality (OUP, 2010), we proposed to combine economic methodology and deontological morality through explicit incorporation of moral constraints into economic models. We argued that the normative flaws of economic analysis can be rectified without relinquishing...

Welfare economics—the normative branch of economics—is a consequentialist moral theory. Unlike deontological morality, at least in its basic form it attributes no intrinsic value to prohibitions on active or intentional harming of other people, lying, or promise breaking, and does not allow...

Economic analysis of law is a powerful analytical methodology. At the same time, as a purely consequentialist approach, which determines the desirability of acts and rules solely by assessing the goodness of their outcomes, standard cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is normatively objectionable. This...

Economic analysis of law is a powerful analytical methodology. However, as a purely consequentialist approach, which determines the desirability of acts and rules solely by assessing the goodness of their outcomes, standard cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is normatively objectionable. Thus, for...

When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order to influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze...

When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order to influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze...

While policy measures affect the welfare of nations, the practice of policy advice is determined by complex rules. Evidence-based scientific policy advice gives weight to hard empirical facts and restrictions. The lecture discusses challenges and conditions for success and provides suggestions...

We first show three major disagreements among today’s leading economists: the minimum wage, the effects of large government debt and the politics of the European Central Bank. Using a prominent and highly relevant example, the possible deterrent effect of death penalty, we demonstrate how...