We study a dynamic moral hazard setting where the manager has private ev- idence that predicts the firm's cash flows. When performance is low, bad news disclosure is rewarded by a lower borrowing cost relative to the no-evidence case. In contrast, no disclosure is associated with higher...

We investigate intertemporal planning problems as a way of gaining understanding of the characteristics of individual decision-makers and the choice options presented to them. A frequent simplifying assumption that is made in studies of this sort is that choice of options that yield lower...

We propose a class of dynamic models that capture subjective (and hence unobservable) constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can acquire, pay attention to, or absorb, via an Information Choice Process (icp). An icp specifies the information that can be acquired about the...

This paper proposes a dynamic theory of capital budgeting and compensation when investment information is decentralized and division manager can inefficiently deploy capital. The incentive cost and firm policies vary monotonically with stored liquidity. After bad performances, liquidity is low,...