Employers in an online labor market often pursue workers with little capacity to take on more work. The pursuit of low-capacity workers is consequential, as these workers are more likely to reject employer inquires, causing a reduction in the probability a job opening is ultimately filled. In an...

Feedback scores in an online marketplace have risen sharply over time, leading to substantial top-censoring. Some of the increase is explained by more satisfied raters, but at least 35-45% is attributable to raters applying lower standards. We show that this "reputation inflation" is the...

Feedback scores in an online marketplace have risen sharply over time, leading to substantial top-censoring. Some of the increase is explained by more satisfied raters, but at least 35-45% is attributable to raters applying lower standards. We show that this “reputation inflation” is the...

Employers in an online labor market often pursue workers with little capacity to take on more work. The pursuit of low-capacity workers is consequential, as these workers are more likely to reject employer inquires, causing a reduction in the probability a job opening is ultimately filled. In an...

In a labor market model with cheap talk, employers can send messages about their willingness to pay for higher-ability workers, which job-seekers can use to direct their search and tailor their wage bid. Introducing such messages leads - under certain conditions - to an informative separating...

In a labor market model with cheap talk, employers can send messages about their willingness to pay for higher-ability workers, which job-seekers can use to direct their search and tailor their wage bid. Introducing such messages leads—under certain conditions—to an informative separating...