Media firms sometimes allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements from an advertisement-based product. We formally examine an ad-based monopolist s incentives to introduce this option. When deciding whether to introduce the option to pay, the monopolist compares the potential direct revenues...

This paper studies an industry where firms can choose to provide open or closed platforms. Open, as opposed to closed, platforms are extendable so that third-party producers can develop extensions for them. Building on a two-sided market model, I show that firms might prefer to commit to keeping...

Private firms may not have efficient incentives to allow third-party producers to access their platform or develop extensions for their products. Based on a two-sided market model, I discuss two reasons for why. First, a private firm may not be able to internalize all benefits from cross-group...

We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price...

Why do so many high-priced acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms take place in network industries? We develop a theory of commercialization (entry or sale) in network industries showing that high equilibrium acquisition prices are driven by the incumbents' desire to prevent rivals from acquiring...

We discuss network neutrality regulation of the Internet in the context of a two-sided market model. Platforms sell broadband Internet access services to residential consumers and may set fees to content and application providers on the Internet. When access is monopolized, cross-group...