A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war structure. Such framing provides a microfounded...

The tug-of-war between single players is known to have a non-cooperative Markov-perfect equilibrium in which both players expend zero efforts and neither player drives the Markov process to one of the terminal states. We show that these peaceful outcomes vanish if the single players are replaced...

This paper analyzes an indirect evolutionary model of sampling biases in probability estimates, which combines the sampling best response dynamics with the replicator dynamics. The arrival rate of revision opportunities in the best response dynamics is high, so that the resulting joint dynamical...

We consider the problem of allocating a tariff-rate quota among a small number of firms which act as middlemen between competitive producers and atomistic consumers and can import a perfect substitute at a fixed world price. We compare the traditional license-on-demand regime to administer such...

This paper analyzes moral hazard in market entry competition between externally funded firms. A finite number of entrepreneurs seek to advance their promising yet loss-making startups into a profitable market. Market entry requires a breakthrough opportunity, which may be obtained at a fixed and...