Showing 1 - 10 of 77
When self-interested agents compete for scarce resources, they often exaggerate the promise of their activities. As such, principals must consider both the quality of each opportunity and each agent's credibility. We show that principals are better off with less transparency because they gain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960168
We develop a game theoretic model of price competition in which an innovating firm can offer product demonstrations. Placing minimal restriction on the firm's ability to design demonstrations, we show that the equilibrium demonstration resolves some but not all customer valuation uncertainty and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081075
Self-interested agents produce information in an attempt to convince a principal to act on their behalf. Agents provide less informative evidence than the principal prefers since doing so maximizes the probability the principal acts in their favor. If the principal faces constraints that limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081078
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282793
We incorporate product demonstrations into a game theoretic model of firm price competition. Demonstrations may include product samples, trials, return policies, reviews, or any other means by which a firm allows consumers to learn about their value for a new product. In our model,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300663
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010520826
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011707384
We consider a game in which schools compete to place graduates by investing in education quality and by choosing grading policies. In equilibrium, schools strategically adopt grading policies that do not perfectly reveal graduate ability to evaluators (including employers and graduate schools)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063799
We model an election in which parties nominate candidates with observable policy preferences prior to a campaign that produces information about candidate quality, a characteristic independent of policy. Informative campaigns lead to greater differentiation in expected candidate quality, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081087
When self-interested agents compete for scarce resources, they often exaggerate the promise of their activities. As such, principals must consider both the quality of each opportunity and each agent's credibility. We show that principals are better off with less transparency because they gain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455408