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We show that allowing communication can increase optimal choices and efficiency in a multi-task, incomplete contracting, principal-agent setting. We study two simple communication protocols, one allowing for one or more requests on non-contractible choices, and the other allowing for a request,...
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Subjects chose whether to leave with an endowment or stay to perform some simple tasks in a real effort experiment. In addition to performance pay, staying subjects received their endowment in the control condition, but had to sacrifice it in the treatment condition. We found average performance...
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We study sets of preferences containing some partial order. It appears that all preferences containing a certain partial order form a convex set of preferences with respect to the betweenness relation induced by the Kemeny distance for preferences. Moreover, the other way round these convex sets...
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Deceptive communication or behavior can inflict loss, making it important to be able to distinguish these from trustworthy ones. This article pursues the hypothesis that repeated exposure or experience can cause learning and hence better detection of deception. We investigate using data from a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226472
When firms set prices and face entry costs, efficiency in production and in entry are not simultaneously achieved, generating the possibility that regulatory interventions can lead to efficiency enhancements. We show through the Bertrand model that in markets with public entry and regular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115420
We conduct an experiment using sequential dictator games where two dictators give serially to a common recipient. In the treatment conditions, the second dictator knows the outcome in the first game and thus the endowment of the recipient. Across treatment conditions, we alter the mechanism that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211716