We show that firms with chief executive officers (CEOs) who gain general managerial skills over their lifetime work experience produce more patents. We address the potential endogenous CEO-firm matching bias using firm-CEO fixed-effects and variation in the enforceability of non-compete...

We show that firms with chief executive officers (CEOs) who gain general managerial skills over their lifetime work experience produce more patents. We address the potential endogenous CEO-firm matching bias using firm-CEO fixed-effects and variation in the enforceability of non-compete...

We show that banks' lending exposure to firms with government procurement contracts can amplify the diabolic loop between sovereigns and banks. Using the fiscal austerity measures implemented during the 2010-2011 European sovereign debt crisis as a shock to government procurement, we find that...

We show that banks' lending exposure to firms with government procurement contracts can amplify the diabolic loop between sovereigns and banks. Using the fiscal austerity measures implemented during the 2010-2011 European sovereign debt crisis as a shock to government procurement, we find that...

We estimate the economic costs of financial distress due to lost sales, by exploiting cross-supplier variation in real estate assets and leverage and the timing of real estate shocks. We show that for the same client buying from different suppliers, its purchases from distressed suppliers...