In this paper, we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the core. The planner's exercise...

Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pareto efficient social choice rules under...

We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the...

We give a direct and very short proof of the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Alan Gibbard (1977) and Mark Satterthwaite (1975)]. The proof is based on investigating the properties of one critical preference profile constructed from those alternatives that individuals are not decisive on....

Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that...

We study Nash implementation in many-to-one matching problems also known as college admission problems [Gale and Shapley, College admission and the stability of marriage, Amer. Math. Monthly 69 (1962) 9-15]. In contrast to the previous literature we make no assumptions regarding the preference...