The price effect of past mergers has been extensively researched over the last two decades. The overwhelming majority of these studies pool post-merger data to estimate the average price effect of a merger. Merger guidelines agree that mergers should be approved if market dynamics, such as...

In this article, we revive an old debate in the law and economics literature: the relative role of public and reputational sanctions in deterring misconduct. We propose an empirical framework, which accounts for public sanctions (in our case cartel fines) and a more direct measure of...

It is widely believed that deterrence constitutes the most important impact of competition policy, but this seems to be largely a matter faith rather than based on any empirical evidence. This paper present a rare attempt to quantify the deterrence effect of cartel policy. It develops a...

Evaluations of competition policy typically establish that consumer benefits from cases detected and rectified comfortably outweigh the costs of competition authorities (CA). However, such assessments are inevitably partial because they do not quantify the impact of deterrence, nor do they...

It is widely believed that deterrence constitutes the most important impact of competition policy, but this seems to be largely a matter faith rather than based on any empirical evidence. This paper present a rare attempt to quantify the deterrence effect of cartel policy. It develops a...

Efficiency defence and merger remedies are key components in most merger control regimes. Although in many jurisdictions both the provision of efficiency-related evidence and remedy offers are at the merging firms' discretion, most previous works have only analysed them separately. This paper is...