Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic...

Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic...

A mechanism is strategy-proof if agents can never profitably manipulate, in any state of the world; however, not all non-strategy-proof mechanisms are equally easy to manipulate - some are more "obviously" manipulable than others. We propose a formal definition of an obvious manipulation and...

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

Abstract An implicit assumption in most of the matching literature is that all participants know their preferences. If there is variance in the effort agents spend researching options, some may know more about their preferences, while others may know less. When this is true, strategizing is...

We consider the problem of aggregating individual preferences over alternatives into a social ranking. A key feature of the problems that we consider---and the one that allows us to obtain positive results, in contrast to negative results such as Arrow's Impossibililty Theorem---is that the...

In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environ- ments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver [2009], and...