We investigate the impact of vertical price restraints on the free-entry equilibrium and its welfare properties in a vertically related market where manufacturer-retailer hierarchies compete under asymmetric information. We compare the legal regimes of laissez-faire and ban on resale price...

We investigate the incentive for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when the retailers are privately informed about their production costs and engage in differentiated good price competition. Partial vertical integration...

We consider a vertically related market characterized by downstream imperfect competition and by the monopolistic provision of an essential facility-based input, whose price is set by a social-welfare maximizing regulator. Our model shows that the regulatory knowledge about the cost for...

This paper addresses the issue of how to design the institutional structure of an industry which provides two differentiated products. One good is supplied by a regulated monopoly and the other is produced in a competitive (unregulated) segment. Two possible institutional patterns are compared....

In a dynamic storable good market where demand changes over time, we investigate the producer's strategic incentives to hold inventories in response to the possibility of buyer stockpiling. The literature on storable goods has demonstrated that buyer stockpiling in anticipation of higher future...

We consider a vertically related market characterized by downstream imperfect competition and by the monopolistic provision of an essential facility-based input, whose price is set by a regulatory agency. Two possible industry patterns are examined: the regime of ownership separation, which...

Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short term contracting. A pure consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is...

Within a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent principal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the...