Ignorance enables individuals to act immorally. This is well known in policy circles, where there is keen interest in lowering moral ignorance. In this paper, we study the (in)elasticity of moral ignorance, with respect to monetary incentives, social norms messages and moral context. We propose...

How does information transmission change when it requires attracting the attention of receivers? This paper combines an experiment that varies freelance professionals’ incentives to attract attention about scientific findings, with several online experiments that exogenously expose receivers...

We introduce a new method for measuring the decision to lie in experiments. In the game, the decision to lie increases own payment independent of the counterpart's decision, but potentially at a cost for the counterpart. We identify at the individual level the decision to lie, and measure how...

We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about the return from contributing to it. The leader decides first and the follower observes the leader's contribution, before deciding whether or not to contribute. Without...