We model a multidivisional firm as a three-tier economic organization. The larger the number of divisions, the lower is the owner's capacity to monitor delegated managers. We show how resultant misaligned managerial incentives can translate into differences in employee incentive schemes between...

We model the teacher-student relationship as an agency problem, where teachers are concerned with human capital formation and students --- ability signaling. The model's distinctive feature is that with grading rules unobservable for the job market the teacher finds grades costless incentives....

We modify the provision point mechanism by introducing reward money, which is distributed among the contributors in proportion to their contributions only when the provision point is not reached. In equilibrium, the provision point is always reached as competition for reward money and preference...

This paper is concerned with cross-dependencies between endogenous market structure and tax policy. We extend the Mirrlees (1971) model of income taxation with a monopolistic competition framework with general additively separable consumer preferences. We show that price and variety distortions...

We study an optimal income taxation problem in a Mirrleesian setting with endogenous product prices and positive firm profits. When firm profits are progressively distributed among agents, we show that the public authority uses the price level as a redistributive tool favoring lower prices in...