In developing countries with weak enforcement institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on electoral incentives to reduce corruption. In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as in many developing countries. Our...

In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption. Our theory shows that when electoral uncertainty is high, as is expected in many developing countries, there is a U-shaped relationship between electoral competition and corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the...

This paper studies the role of job search frictions and gender norms in shaping intrahousehold labor market outcomes in developing countries. We conduct a field experiment in Delhi, India where we randomly offer access to a hyper-local digital job search and matching platform either to married...

What motivates individuals to participate in social activism? Do awareness campaigns and information about others' willingness to act play a role? We conduct an online experiment within a survey of nearly 2000 Indian men, focusing on activism to combat health sector fraud during the COVID-19...

This paper analyzes the existence of electoral cycles in infrastructure provision in the context of a large rural road building program in India. We use data covering 150,000 roads over a decade to demonstrate an increase in road building activity before state elections. These electoral cycles...