We show that, on average, product market competition acts as a disciplining force constraining managers from misreporting accounting information. Further, in a quasi-natural experiment that uses shifts in import tariffs to identify intensification of competition, difference-in-difference...

We show that, on average, product market competition acts as a disciplining force constraining managers from misreporting accounting information. Further, in a quasi-natural experiment that uses shifts in import tariffs to identify intensification of competition, difference-in-difference...

To test hypotheses about earnings management many studies investigate managers' manipulation of real activities (real earnings management, REM). Tests using measures of abnormal REM hinge critically on the measurement of normal real activities. Yet there is no systematic evidence on the...

Considering the voluminous published research confirming and extending the original findings of Cohen, Dey, Lys (2008), we conclude that Pincus, Wu, and Hwang (2022, this issue) make, at best, only a modest contribution to the earnings management literature. Specifically, their analysis does not...

We examine the information role of accounting disclosures on warranties, utilizing a database that became available due to the requirements of FIN 45. First, because firms use warranty policies as a business strategy to promote their products, a warranty reserve can serve two roles: an...