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Do voters vote ideologically?
Degan, Arianna; Merlo, Antonio - In: Journal of economic theory 144 (2009) 5, pp. 1868-1894
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003896683
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Do voters vote ideologically?
Degan, Arianna (contributor); Merlo, Antonio (contributor) - 2008 - Rev., third version
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003769432
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A structural model of turnout and voting in multiple elections
Degan, Arianna; Merlo, Antonio - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (2011) 2, pp. 209-245
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009247257
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Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment
Merlo, Antonio - In: Journal of political economy 105 (1997) 1, pp. 101-131
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001217234
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Modelos de duración del gobierno para el caso italiano : un análisis econométrico
Merlo, Antonio - In: Información comercial española / Cuadernos económicos (1996), pp. 213-233
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001219100
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Whither political economy? : theories, facts and issues
Merlo, Antonio - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003401999
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Political economy and policy analysis
Merlo, Antonio - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011904921
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A surprise-quiz view of learning in economic experiments
Merlo, Antonio; Schotter, Andrew - In: Games and economic behavior 28 (1999) 1, pp. 25-54
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001430564
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On the political economy of income redistribution and crime
İmrohoroğlu, Ayşe; Merlo, Antonio; Rupert, Peter - In: International economic review 41 (2000) 1, pp. 1-25
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001476722
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Endogenous lobbying
Felli, Leonardo; Merlo, Antonio - 2000
In this paper the authors endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. They find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always effects equilibrium policy outcomes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489479