We examine how retailers discount the prices of product systems versus their constituent components. The topic is important because such systems are ubiquitous in our daily lives. In particular, many high-tech markets revolve around complex multi-component systems – e.g. a camera system...

Existing studies, largely based in the transaction cost economics tradition, approach the issue of vertical scope from the point of view of the decision faced by the individual firm about whether to make or buy, given a set of existing markets and well-defined vertical segments. However, recent...

This paper analyzes the endogenous choice of delegation with two firms producing goods of different qualities. We find that an asymmetric delegation structure emerges as the high-quality firm chooses to delegate and low-quality firm chooses non delegation contract under Cournot competition. Even...

We consider an exporting firm facing FX risk. We show that FX options are not used for hedging, if there is no ex-post production flexibility. Hence, in the standard setting of having no ex-post optionality, hedging with forwards is the best choice.The value of FX options for hedging arises as...

The problem of managerial agency costs dominates debates in corporate law. Many leading scholars advocate reforms that would reduce agency costs by forcing firms to allocate more control to shareholders. Such proposals disregard the costs that shareholders avoid by delegating control to managers...

Some scholars have argued that common ownership, which refers to an investor's simultaneous ownership of small stockholdings in several competing companies, is anticompetitive and prohibited by the U.S. antitrust laws. Proponents of this view target in particular large investment managers that...

Partial ownership of stock in multiple competing firms is an important scholarly and policy topic in both corporate and antitrust law. Until now, the discussion has focused on ownership. This essay shifts the debate from a focus on common ownership to a focus on common control. No prior work has...

Horizontal shareholding exists when significant shareholders have stock in horizontal competitors. (It is often imprecisely called "common shareholding," but that term can also apply when shareholders own stock in two noncompeting corporations. It differs from "cross-shareholding," which...

This Article shows that new economic proofs and empirical evidence provide powerful confirmation that, even when horizontal shareholders individually have minority stakes, horizontal shareholding in concentrated markets often has anticompetitive effects. The new economic proofs show that,...

Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models show that substantial horizontal shareholdings are likely to anticompetitively raise prices when the owned businesses compete...