Using instrumental variables, we find that having more antitakeover provisions is not only more likely to prevent a bid but also more likely to cause management resistance in the event of not doing so. The deterrent effect is likely to be decreasing in the cost to rival bidders of acquiring...

We investigate how ownership structure influences operating performance and implied agency costs using multi-year data on over 42,000 firms, covering the full spectrum of ownership and management arrangements ranging from owner or non-owner managed single or multiple-owner private firms, through...

We investigate the relation between corporate governance characteristics of hostile takeover targets and the choice to employ 'harmful' resistance that is not perceived as being motivated by shareholders' interests. We find that harmful resistance is associated with firms where managers have...

We examine the nature of takeover resistance by investigating the determinants of the choice by target managers to take post-offer actions designed to aggressively frustrate the takeover bid, in preference to choosing passive resistance through tactics that just secure a better offer for...