Prior literature suggests that voluntary disclosures of forward-looking information tend to lead to capital market benefits, but these disclosures may also result in negative capital market consequences if subsequent performance falls below expectations. We therefore hypothesize that convex...

We use observed insider trading data to estimate the start and end points of quarterly open trading windows, and find that voluntary insider trading restrictions reflect concerns about information asymmetry, the strength of external monitoring, and executives’ liquidity needs. We also identify...

We examine how constraints on directors' availability to serve on boards influence their labor market outcomes. We find that directors who lose (or leave) a board are more likely to subsequently gain a new board seat, regardless of their performance on the departed board, suggesting that...

We investigate whether the mix of financial covenants in debt contracts allows lenders to screen borrowers based on their private information about their future risk-taking intentions. Consistent with adverse selection theories, we predict and find that borrowers with greater risk-taking...

I examine the relation between shareholder value and managerial risk-taking and how this value-risk tradeoff influences managers' incentive compensation packages. I find that shareholder value increases with risk and therefore managerial risk aversion creates potential agency conflicts between...