We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe private correlated signals that are contingent on the true state of the world. We show that, while necessary, Bayes plausibility is not sufficient for a distribution over posterior belief vectors to...

We study markets for information in the form of Bayesian signals. The main feature of such markets is that information is costly for the seller to acquire and cannot be verified by the buyer. We provide a full characterization of the set of all compensation schemes (viz., menus) which guarantee...

In this paper, the interactions between a large informed trader (IT, for short) and a high-frequency trader (HFT, for short) who can anticipate the former's incoming order are studied in an extended Kyle's model. Equilibria under various specific situations are discussed. We find that, in...

We consider how one party can induce another party to join an international emission compact given private information. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent. This leads to a number of non-standard features: Optimal...

For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if...