We investigate manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: non-manipulability via merging and nonmanipulability via splitting. Not surprisingly, non-manipulability via splitting is incompatible with some basic axioms: claim boundedness, limited...

We introduce the constrained egalitarian surplus-sharing rule fCE, which distributes an amount of a divisible resource so that the poorer agents' resulting payoffs become equal but not larger than any remaining agent's status quo payoff. We show that fCE is characterized by Pareto optimality,...

A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to improve equally. We show that the set of...

We address the problem of clearing mutual obligations among agents when a financial network collapses. To do so, we adopt an axiomatic approach and provide the first comprehensive characterization of the rules based on the principle of proportionality, covering the entire domain of financial...