A formal framework for the treatment of hierarchical coalition formation and hierarchical agreements under both the bargaining and blocking approaches to coalition formation is introduced, and some first positive results on the possibility of full agreement and the efficiency of hierarchical...

Using Putnam’s two‐level game approach, we discuss the influence of domestic players that can veto the ratification of international environmental agreements on the breadth and depth of such treaties. We first show that in a symmetric Barrett‐type payoff model, veto-players can restrict...

Are there collective decision methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an equal share of effective power even if voters act strategically, (ii) promote consensus and equality, rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the status quo or rely too much on...

We consider games where individual contributions are costly but beneficial to other players, so that contributing nothing is a dominant strategy. Considering that players may be unable to write binding agreements but may make binding unilateral commitments that are conditional on others'...

Standard macroeconomic models assume that households are rational in the sense that they are perfect utility maximizers, and explain economic dynamics in terms of shocks that drive the economy away from the steady-state. Here we build on a standard macroeconomic model in which a single rational...