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We explore the determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a formal model of the policy-making process in which government regulates financial risk at both the firm and systemic levels, and test these predictions with a novel, comprehensive data set of financial regulatory laws enacted...
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The G20's push towards central clearing changed the shape of the world's financial system: all standardized derivative contracts must now be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs). Despite considerable debate, the impact of central clearing nonetheless remains ambiguous and hard to...
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In this paper, we simulate and analyze the impact of financial regulations concerning the collateralization of derivative trades on systemic risk - a topic that has been vigorously discussed since the financial crisis in 2007/08. Experts often disagree on the efficacy of these regulations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941050
Over the past three decades, antitrust laws have proliferated across the globe. International institutions and governments have promoted antitrust policy as an important regulatory tool to enhance economic performance. At the same time, we have scant empirical evidence on whether these policies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254619
This chapter reviews the literature on commercial lobbying. It places this literature into the context of the broader lobbying literature. Commercial lobbyists work for for-profit organizations that sell their services as intermediaries between policymakers and special interest groups. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077725
We model which special interest groups lobby which policymakers directly, and which employ for-profit intermediaries. We show that special interests affected by policy issues that frequently receive high political salience lobby policymakers directly, while those that rarely receive high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892218