I explore the theoretical properties of earnings, prices, and compensation contracts under the assumption that strategic managers are evaluated based on audited financial reports of their own making. If auditors require managers to provide verifiable evidence substantiating the contents of their...

I develop an agency model in which performance measurement and compensation contracts are jointly used to shape incentives. When an agent has extensive control over firm value, there tend to be many optimal measures — each implying a unique optimal contract with a strikingly simple closed form...

Prior studies attribute analysts' forecast superiority over time-series forecasting models to their access to a large set of firm, industry, and macroeconomic information (an information advantage), which they use to update their forecasts on a daily, weekly or monthly basis (a timing...

This paper examines a mixed data sampling (MIDAS) approach to accounting research. MIDAS regression models parsimoniously incorporate variation embedded in existing economic data that are observed at much higher frequencies than accounting data. The additional source of data variation creates an...