One-size-fits-all recommendations are common in many contexts, including those with a widespread heterogeneity. We propose a model that rationalizes this phenomenon. An expert recommends publicly to two agents whether to adopt a policy. The expert is privately informed about agents' payoffs from...

An issuer, privately informed about the distribution of the project's cash flows, raises financing from an uninformed investor through a security sale. The investor faces Knightian uncertainty about the distribution of cash flows and evaluates each security by the worst-case distribution at...

We study time-consistent debt policies in a trade-off model of debt in which the firm can freely issue new debt and repurchase existing debt. A debt policy is time-consistent if in any state equityholders prefer to follow it rather than to deviate from it but lose credibility in sustaining debt...

In over-the-counter markets, the presence of two frictions is central to determine prices, liquidity, and efficiency: the search friction reflected in how long it takes to find a trading opportunity and the bargaining friction reflected in how promptly gains from trade are realized once the...

Abstract An asset owner designs an asset-backed security and a signal about its value. After privately observing the signal, he sells the security to the monopolistic liquidity supplier. Any optimal signal structure guarantees the security sale and commits the issuer not to learn too positive...