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Condorcet Jury Theorem in a Spatial Model of Elections

Bhattacharya, Sourav - 2018

status quo and a proposed reform, and there is uncertainty about the location of the reform on the policy space. If each … possible location of the reform is on the same side of the status quo, then equilibria are full information equivalent. If … there is uncertainty about whether the reform lies to the left or right of the status quo, then we have multiple equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911569

Multiwinner Approval Voting : An Apportionment Approach

Brams, Steven J. - 2017

We extend approval voting so as to elect multiple candidates, who may be either individuals or members of a political party, in rough proportion to their approval in the electorate. We analyze two divisor methods of apportionment, first proposed by Jefferson and Webster, that iteratively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960207

Preferences, actions and voting rules

Artabe, Alaitz; Laruelle, Annick; Valenciano, Federico - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 15-28

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506468

Computational complexity in the design of voting systems

Takamiya, Koji (contributor); Tanaka, Akira (contributor) - 2006

This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting rules, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not. --...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321306

Computational Complexity in the Design of Voting Systems

Takamiya, Koji; Tanaka, Akira - 2006

This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting systems, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We point out that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059113

Bounds for the Nakamura Number

Freixas, Josep - 2017

The Nakamura number is an appropriate invariant of a simple game in order to study the existence of social equilibria and the possibility of cycles. For symmetric quota games its number can be obtained by an easy formula. For some subclasses of simple games the corresponding Nakamura number has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012943277

The Inverse Problem for Power Distributions in Committees

Kurz, Sascha - 2014

Several power indices have been introduced in the literature in order to measure the influence of individual committee members on the aggregated decision. Here we ask the inverse question and aim to design voting rules for a committee such that a given desired power distribution is met as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149016

Reluctant to reform? : a note on risk-loving politicians and bureaucrats

Thomas, Tobias; Hess, Moritz; Wagner, Gert G. - 2017

resistance to reform is based on the differences in the risk preferences of voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. Based on the … structural reform. Hence, it must be caused by other reasons. These can be for instance - as public choice scholars argue … - interventions by veto players, wars of attrition by powerful interest groups, or reform logjams initiated. However, another point of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011746548

Reluctant to reform? : a note on risk-loving politicians and bureaucrats

Thomas, Tobias; Hess, Moritz; Wagner, Gert G. - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738887

Reluctant to reform? : a note on risk-loving politicians and bureaucrats

Thomas, Tobias; Hess, Moritz; Wagner, Gert G. - 2017

investigate if the resistance to reform is based on the differences in the risk preferences of voters, politicians, and … voters, their risk preferences cannot be seen as an explanation for the resistance to structural reform. Hence, it must be … reform logjams initiated. However, as during times of populist campaigns, the election process can put forth candidates with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011740361