We analyze dynamic stationary models of capital structure, in partial and general equilibrium, when managers cannot commit to firm-value maximization. The model permits us to quantify both the private cost to firms of the commitment problem, and also the aggregate cost of its externality. Our...

We propose and model that firms face two potential defaults: Financial default on their debt obligations and operational default such as a failure to deliver on obligations to customers. Hence, firms with limitations on outside financing substitute between saving cash for financial hedging to...

We derive an optimal compensation contract that incentivizes a credit rating agency (CRA) to exert effort and issue unbiased ratings. The contract rewards CRA when its credit rating is matched by the subsequent bond performance and penalizes it otherwise. The optimal contract can be implemented...

This paper studies, both theoretically and empirically, the optimal executive compensation when firm performance is a noisy signal of executive’s hidden effort and the volatility of firm performance is stochastic. We build a tractable dynamic principal-agent model and show analytically that...