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The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068808
After only a brief hiatus in the wake of the stock market downturn of 2000, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels have resumed their upward trajectory. In response, many influential shareholders and academics are asking the question: Are the executive compensation arrangements we observe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220350
In a management buyout (MBO), the managers of a company typically partner with a financing source, such as a private equity firm, to acquire the firm that employs them. MBOs raise an important corporate governance concern not present in other corporate acquisitions: managers act as fiduciaries...
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The sharing of regulatory authority with private actors ("private ordering") has lengthy historical precedent and, in recent years, has been rapidly expanding in scope, domestically and abroad. Nowhere is its expansion as prevalent as in the commercial, financial, and business sector...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014120800
This book chapter, which synthesizes several of the author's articles, attempts to provide useful perspectives on regulating systemic risk. First, it argues that systemic shocks are inevitable. Accordingly, regulation should be designed not only to try to reduce those shocks but also to protect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999564
Domestic and international regulatory efforts to prevent another financial crisis have been converging on the idea of trying to end the problem of “too big to fail”—that systemically important financial firms take excessive risks because they profit from success and are (or at least,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012967982
This article rethinks the shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance, arguing that bondholders, who are more risk averse than shareholders, should be included in the governance of systemically important firms. The inclusion of bondholders not only could help to reduce systemic risk but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969873