People are shown to be “more (less) trusting as others are on average more (less) trusting” in a binary-choice-with-social-interactions model that is estimated using cross-section data from more than sixty countries, with mean trust as an explanatory variable. These endogenous effects...

The idea that people follow trust norms when making trust decisions is developed in an evolutionary model of adaptive play by boundedly rational agents. Because it neither implies nor is it implied by cooperation, trust is not modelled as cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma but as a coordination...

This article establishes that there are significant social influences on the decisions made by individuals about whether to trust others. These social interactions effects may arise from exogenous-environmental characteristics or from endogenous effects that make people conform to the particular...

The Hirshleifer model of conflict is used to argue that without voluntary action to increase human security, the state may have extensive opportunities and incentives to increase the risk of conflict in the many poor countries where central governments provide local public goods. Metaphorically,...

We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...