The share of stocks beneficially owned by institutional investors has increased substantially over the last three decades. Together with a high and increasing level of concentration in the asset management industry, this trend implies that a small number of institutional investors now constitute...

We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns...

This internet appendix complements the paper "Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership" and is organized as follows: Section I outlines a model of competition under common ownership that yields the network density measure of common ownership concentration we use in the empirical analysis. The...

We document substantial time-series and cross-sectional variation in branch-level deposit account interest rates, maintenance fees, and fee thresholds, and examine whether variation in bank concentration helps explain variation in these prices. HHI alone is not correlated with any of the outcome...

We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns...

We use data from the U.S. airline industry to test the hypothesis, consistent with the general equilibrium oligopoly model of Azar and Vives (forthcoming), that inter-industry common ownership should be associated with lower prices in product markets. We find that, as the model predicts,...

This note argues that the evidence presented in several critiques of Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu’s “airlines” paper does often not back the conclusion these studies draw. Specifically, widely circulated studies claiming that there are no anticompetitive effects of common ownership, or that...

We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns...

In this study, we examine the effects of common ownership on labor market outcomes. We find that an increase in common ownership in a labor market is associated with decreases in both wages per employee and the employment-to-population ratio. We conduct an event study based on the acquisition of...

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework in which firms are large and have market power, with respect to both products and labor, and in which a firm's decisions are affected by its ownership structure. We characterize the Cournot--Walras equilibrium of an economy where each firm...