The reasons why people migrate are often multiple and changing, and the categories of ‘economic migrant’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ are too rigid to reflect reality. There are many shared motivations for regular and irregular migration. Having the capability and economic means to migrate is...

This paper provides the kernel of the migration literature on remittances. It started from their three most debated features: stability, cyclicality and sustainability. Then moved to the motives driving remittances and, finally, their relationship with development. Both sustainability and...

This paper have presented the kernel of the migration literature on remittances. It started from their three most debated features: stability, cyclicality and sustainability. Then moved to the motives driving remittances and, finally, their relationship with development. Both sustainability and...

This paper aims to generate new theoretical and empirical insights into the way states and policies shape migration processes in their interaction with other migration determinants in receiving and sending countries. More fundamentally, this state of-the-art reveals a still limited understanding...

This paper aims to generate new theoretical and empirical insights into the way states and policies shape migration processes in their interaction with other migration determinants in receiving and sending countries. More fundamentally, this state of-the-art reveals a still limited understanding...

Border enforcement of immigration laws attempts to raise the costs of illegal immigration, while interior enforcement also lowers the benefits. Border and interior enforcement therefore reduce the net benefits of illegal immigration and should lower the probability that an individual will decide...

This paper studies why illegal immigration is widespread. We develop a political agency model in which a politician decides on an immigration target and its enforcement, facing uncertainty on the supply of migrants. Illegal immigration can arise for two reasons: the policy maker may be unable to...

We build a general equilibrium model in which both illegal immigration and the size of the informal sector are endogenously determined. In this framework, we show that indirect policy measures such as tax reduction and detection of informal activities can be used as substitutes for border...

We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policy-maker faces uncertainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on its preferences and the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that a utilitarian government...