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Communication and Information Sharing in Teams

Rothenberg, Naomi - 2015

This paper studies whether dissemination of private, pre-decision signals about productivity is valuable to the principal when agents work sequentially and observe each other’s effort. The benefit of dissemination is that when productivity states are correlated, each agent’s signal is useful...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014042884

Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks

Acemoglu, Daron; Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman E. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 41-97

We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information … to form a costly \textit{communication link} with, incurring the associated cost. After receiving a \textit …{private signal} correlated with the underlying state, they exchange information over the induced \textit{communication network} until …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684965

Communication with Unknown Perspectives

Sethi, Rajiv - 2016

Consider a group of individuals with unobservable perspectives (subjective prior beliefs) about a sequence of states. In each period, each individual receives private information about the current state and forms an opinion (a posterior belief). She also chooses a target individual and observes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007190

Media Competition and Information Disclosure

Andina-Díaz, Ascensión - 2007

This paper analyzes an election game where self-interested politicians can exploit the lack of information that voters have about candidates' preferred policies in order to pursue their own agendas. In such a setup, we study the incentives of newspapers to acquire costly information, and how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224324

Ideology without ideologists

Mechtenberg, Lydia (contributor) - 2007

Generally, Democrats do not increase military spending, and Republicans do not raise welfare payments. Mostly, ruling politicians stick to the manifesto of their party. The current paper provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon that does not assume politicians or voters to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003633611

Misinterpretation and Misprediction in Communication

Miura, Shintaro - 2016

of the bias parameter is common knowledge, communication between the players may exhibit misinterpretation (i.e., the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006475

Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest

Dilmé, Francesc - 2022

This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver with similar objectives. We provide a first-order approximation of the equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with a small bias. Our analysis goes beyond the usual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013163024

Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest

Dilmé, Francesc - 2019

This paper provides a complete first-order characterization of equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel (1982)'s model when the conflict of interest is small. This exercise allows us to deepen our understanding of how a state-dependent bias and a non-uniform...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012893298

Communication and Binary Decisions : Is it Better to Communicate?

Loss, Frédéric - 2010

communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex ante) outperform delegation. Referring to multiple experts allow the decision …-maker to obtain more information. However, this information can never be perfect, and sophisticated communication games, for … instance with multilateral, multistage communication, do not outperform simple communication methods …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146150

Optimal Strategic Communication : Can a Less Informed Expert Be More Informative?

Ivanov, Maxim G. - 2006

This paper investigates an extended version of Crawford-Sobel's (1982) communication game in which the principal can …-Sobel's most informative equilibrium and optimal delegation. We then study multi-stage communication. This modification results in … truth-telling communication at every stage. Finally, we construct a mechanism in which approximately full information is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059602