This paper studies when introducing verifiable communication choices between agents in a cheap-talk benchmark setting, with social tie, is beneficial to welfare. In our model agents have two ways to communicate their private information: either through a costly verifiable information (hard) link...

Regulation to protect individuals from self-harm, such as euthanasia prohibitions and safety mandates, is widespread but controversial. Opponents and proponents are often believed to differ in their valuation of individual liberty. We model an authority's decision to constrain or inform a...

We propose an amplification mechanism of financial crises based on the information choice of investors. Adverse news about the solvency of a debtor raises the value of private information and therefore induces the acquisition of information. Informed investors rely more on private information...

In this paper we present a general equilibrium model to analyze competition between multiple venues (dealers), endogenous market segmentation, transaction speeds and fees, trading volume, optimal regulator's choice for taxing traders, and welfare in illiquid asset markets. Differences in trading...

We consider a simple equilibrium model of active fund managers and consumers. Our model features zero net-of-fee alpha in equilibrium. However, using a common, but misspecified, model for the stochastic discount factor (SDF) implies positive measured alpha. This note, thus, warns against...

This paper studies how mandatory transparency (through TRACE), along with long term incentive of informed dealers, affect market price informativeness, liquidity and welfare in dynamic over-the-counter (OTC) markets. We show public disclosure of additional information about past trades,...