in the marriage market: in this case the ω-core and the α-core coincide and are both non-empty. In addition, we show that …We consider marriage markets with externalities. We focus on weak externalities, that is, markets in which each agent …

Scarf's algorithm [18] provides fractional core elements for NTU-games. Biró and Fleiner [3] showed that Scarf …

(1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of …

In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those …

sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining … positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive … results on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games. -- Inner Core ; Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution ; Competitive …