In antitrust enforcement, in the context of cost-benefit analysis, neoclassical economics may be interpreted as arguing for the use of a total welfare standard whose implementation treats transfers as welfare-neutral. Several recent papers call for antitrust agencies to move in the direction of...

Monopolists selling complementary products charge a higher price in a static equilibrium than a single multiproduct monopolist would, reducing both the industry profits and consumer surplus. However, firms could instead reach a Pareto improvement by lowering prices to the single monopolist...

Economists regularly decry the persistence with which firms set prices above marginal cost and thus, according to the economists, fail to maximize profits. But it is the economists who have it wrong - first, because variable accounting costs are not always a good proxy for marginal economic...

The importance of economics to the analysis and enforcement of competition policy and law has increased tremendously in the developed market economies in the past forty years. In younger and developing market economies, competition law itself has a history of twenty to twenty-five years at most...

In antitrust enforcement as in cost-benefit analysis, neoclassical economics may be interpreted as arguing for the use of a quot;total welfarequot; standard whose implementation treats transfers as welfare-neutral. Several recent papers call for antitrust agencies to move in the direction of...

This paper presents a non-technical introduction to three economic tools that have in recent years become widespread in competition law enforcement in general and in the analysis of proposed mergers in particular: critical loss analysis, upward pricing pressure, and the vertical arithmetic. In...