The article discusses the introduction of collective redress in the EU, with special emphasis on the comparison to the US class action suits in the field of competition law. After briefly overviewing EU's approach to implementing collective redressing and a description of the history and nature...

We reexamine the common argument that rules produce greater credibility than discretion. Rules limit the actions of agents, restricting observations of the agents' preferences or types. In a second-best world, where rules cannot be everlasting, a regime of discretion in some periods may produce...

Self-regulation is common, but comparative analysis of self-regulation and government regulation is rare. This paper identifies conditions determining whether regulation is delegated or centralized, analyzing the welfare implications of regulatory regime choice. Because regulatory authority...

We contrast the laissez-faire regime with the regime of strict producer liability, and draw the implications for competition policy, in a setting where oligopolistic firms cannot differentiate themselves from rivals but rather are bound by a common industry reputation for product safety. We show...

We study the problem of torts in a framework where a firm's accident adversely impacts all firms in the industry because of the presence of industry reputation effects. Industry reputation effects lead to interdependence among firms and give rise to strategic firm behavior. We characterize the...