Showing 1 - 10 of 62
Ignorance enables individuals to act immorally. This is well known in policy circles, where there is keen interest in lowering moral ignorance. In this paper, we study the (in)elasticity of moral ignorance, with respect to monetary incentives, social norms messages and moral context. We propose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849807
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013369188
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009389091
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009412847
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892239
Agents in a finite two-sided market are matched assortatively, based on costly investments. Besides signaling private, complementary types, investments generate direct benefits for partners. We explore quantitative properties of the equilibrium investment behavior. The bilateral external...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927514
According to the previous literature on hiring, firms face a trade-off when deciding on external recruiting: From an incentive perspective, external recruiting is harmful since admission of external candidates reduces internal workers’ career incentives. However, if external workers have high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009126097
We study how institutional design influences moral transgression. People are heterogeneous in their feelings of guilt and can share guilt with others. Institutions determine the number of supporters necessary for immoral outcomes to occur. With more supporters required, every supporter can share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009763121
We study how institutional design in influences moral transgression. People are heterogeneous in their feelings of guilt and can share guilt with others. Institutions determine the number of supporters necessary for immoral outcomes to occur. With more supporters required, every supporter can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010193163
External recruiting at least weakly improves the quality of the pool of applicants, but the incentive implications are less clear. Using a contest model, this paper investigates the pure incentive effects of external recruiting. Our results show that if workers are heterogeneous, the opening of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198504