Why does the market react to companies’ announcements of strategic alternatives with a +5.2 percent return, only to experience a future return of -9.7 percent? We find evidence consistent with a mispricing explanation in that: (i) investors and analysts are overly optimistic about a potential...

Regulatory information disclosure is an important measure to enhance government transparency and law enforcement credibility. Studies mainly focus on ex-post disclosure and affirm its positive effects. However, ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information, as a representative regulatory policy,...

The objective of voluntary disclosure regulation is to mitigate information asymmetry between the management and outside users. However, prior studies on voluntary disclosures provide mixed evidences on managers' incentives. Using a setting of voluntary non-GAAP EPS reporting, this study...

In this paper, we examine the effect of managers' pay duration on firms' voluntary disclosures. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers' annual compensation to vest. We hypothesize and find that pay duration can incentivize managers to provide more bad news earnings...

This paper presents a model of voluntary disclosure in which the manager's information about the firm's value is granular, i.e., consists of a large random number of imprecise signals. Using an argument in the spirit of the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, we show that there exists a simple...

Recent SEC regulations mandate that hedge fund advisers provide narrative disclosures of their business and operations. We find that 40% of these disclosures contain inconsistencies regarding advisers' regulatory histories, conflicts of interest (COIs), and risks. Inconsistencies are associated...

Public information that becomes available after a manager’s initial voluntary disclosure decision creates incentives for her to reconsider and possibly change that decision. We show that if she has private information that is value relevant or that impacts the firms ability to compete in its...

We examine whether managers convey more information via voluntary disclosure channels when standard-setters limit managers' discretion in GAAP. We estimate the extent to which standard setters limit managers' discretion by counting the number of times obligatory modal verbs are mentioned in the...

This study examines how private communication among competitors shapes their public disclosures. Theories at the intersection of accounting and industrial organization suggest that competing firms can use public disclosure to coordinate, and predict a substitutive relation between private...

We test the hypothesis that less transparency in financial disclosures is an undesirable firm attribute that increases the amount of information and unemployment risk that employees bear, resulting in a wage premium. Using establishment-level wage data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we document...