We model the reporting of sexual misconduct. Individuals under-report misconduct due to strategic uncertainty over whether others will report and corroborate a pattern of behavior. Under-reporting occurs if and only if misconduct is widespread. Making sanctions more responsive to reports,...

Why do individuals interpret the same information differently? We propose that individuals follow Bayes' Rule when forming posteriors with one exception: when assessing the credibility of experts, they "double-dip" the data and use already-updated beliefs instead of their priors. Our proposed...

Why does misinformation persist, and how does it distort the long-run beliefs and actions of rational agents? We study a model where receivers see an infinite stream of messages from a sender of unknown type who observes private signals about an unknown state of the world. We characterize the...

This paper studies the role of goal bracketing to attenuate time inconsistency. When setting non-binding goals for a multi-stage project, an agent must also decide how and when to evaluate himself against such goals. In particular, he can bracket broadly by setting an aggregate goal for the...