This paper focuses on two equity dimensions of climate policy, intra- and intergenerational equity, and analyzes the implications of equity preferences on climate policy, and on the production and consumption patterns in rich and poor countries. We develop a dynamic two-region model, in which...

This paper focuses on two equity aspects of climate policy, intra- and intergenerational equity, and analyzes the implications of equity preferences on climate policy, and on the production and consumption patterns in rich and poor countries. We develop a dynamic two-region model, in which each...

This paper focuses on two equity dimensions of climate policy, intra- and intergenerational equity, and analyzes the implications of equity preferences on climate policy, and on the production and consumption patterns in rich and poor countries. We develop a dynamic two-region model, in which...

The optimal social cost of carbon is in general equilibrium proportional to GDP if utility is logarithmic, production is Cobb-Douglas, depreciation in 100% every period, climate damages as fraction of production decline exponentially with the stock of atmospheric carbon, and fossil fuel...

We determine optimal climate policy using a dynamic climate model that accounts for the damages to capital and human health from burning fossil fuels. Our theoretical macroeconomic approach incorporates a separate health sector into an integrated climate-economy framework and provides...

We estimate the welfare implications of a cost-reflective 'Coasian' reform of electricity network tariffs using an Irish case study. We find that current Distribution Use of System (DUoS) tariffs deviate considerably from a cost-reflective structure. At the individual level, tariff reform leads...

A formula is derived for the social cost of carbon (SCC) that takes account of intragenerational income inequality and its evolution with economic growth. The social discount rate (SDR) should be adjusted to account for intragenerational and intergenerational inequality aversion and for risk...

Using a threshold public good experiment, we examine how varying degrees of inequality in resources and differences in risk of loss among players affect the success of group efforts to avoid a common loss. We find that when the poor face greater risk than the rich, contributions and success in...

It is explored in this paper how – depending on the agents' preferences – an unequal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative Lindahl equilibrium that arises from a balanced income distribution. The degree of...

It is explored in this paper how – depending on the agents’ preferences – an unequal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative Lindahl equilibrium that arises from a balanced income distribution. The degree of...