This paper examines the role of convertible debt when venture capitals invest in young companies. In venture financing, lenders do not have sufficient information to estimate the productivity of firm's projects.We construct a model in which a borrower can communicate information about the...

We examine the benefits and costs of internal capital allocation with costly information acquisition by an executive officer in the headquarter of the multi-divisional firm. Then we characterize the optimal compensation scheme for the officer that maximizes the expected firm value. The...

We investigate a firm's pre-emptive behavior by comparing Cournot competition and Stackelberg games with one leader and multiple followers, where each firm has access to private information on stochastic demand. We show that the firm prefers pre-emptive quantity choice (Stackelberg leader) to...

We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxation regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and "rent seeking" regimes. We show that decentralized taxation results in inefficiently high...